Pensions: Security in the Future or Securities Under the Law? by Levin, David R.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 2 Winter 1978 Article 7 
1978 
Pensions: Security in the Future or Securities Under the Law? 
David R. Levin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
David R. Levin, Pensions: Security in the Future or Securities Under the Law?, 27 Cath. U. L. Rev. 364 
(1978). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss2/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
PENSIONS: SECURITY IN THE FUTURE
OR SECURITIES UNDER THE LAW?
Private pension funds, an important source of capital for the devel-
opment of commerce and industry, are extensively regulated under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' The
Seventh Circuit, recognizing that these funds are also the sole invest-
ment vehicle for millions of Americans, ruled recently in Daniel v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters2 that the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws apply to pensions. In so ruling the court held that an
interest in a pension fund is a "security" 3 and that participation in a
pension plan involves a "sale" ' 4 of that security. The decision has
aroused considerable interest because of its potential impact on the
pension community and on those presently charged with implementing
ERISA. This article introduces a new approach to pensions and the
arguments raised in and by the Daniel decision.
I. PENSIONS: GIFTS OR SECURITIES?
The first pension plan for employees of private industry in the United
States was introduced in 1875 by the American Express Company.
Similar plans were slow to be adopted and by 1930 only 2.8 million
workers-fifteen percent of the privately employed, nonagricultural
work force-were covered by pension plans. 5 During the 1930's, pension
assets and reserves tripled ($2.4 billion) and by the end of that decade the
number of employees enjoying the benefit of private pension coverage
had reached four million.6 These pensions were generally considered to
be a bounty or reward offered by benevolent employers to their employ-
ees. Therefore, although employees could expect something more than a
gold watch at retirement, the right to receive any benefits was controlled
solely by the employer.
7
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1368 (Supp. V 1975).
2. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978)
(No. 77-753).
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(10) (1976).
4. See id. §§ 77b(3), 78c(14).
5. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, PENSION FACTS 1976, at 19 (1976).
6. Id. at 9.
7. E. ALLEN, J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 13-17 (3d ed. 1976).
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Although the Federal Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
was created in 1920,8 Congress first dealt with private pensions when it
enacted the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 10 Prior to the enactment of this legislation, thousands of individuals
had invested their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in
worthless securities. In summarizing the purposes of the legislation he
sought, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt wrote the Congress on
March 29, 1933: "What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of
the ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and other
agencies handling or using other people's money are trustees acting for
others.""I
The legislative history of these Acts indicates that Congress intended
to include pension plans within the definition of a security. Securities
and Exchange Commissioner Ganson Purcell, testifying before Congress
in 1941, stated that among the proposals for amending the Securities Act
which were advanced in 1934, one would have exempted from registra-
tion "an offering made solely to employees of an issuer or its affiliates in
connection with a bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation
or stock investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such employees." ,
12
This proposal went to conference, but was eliminated by the conference
committee, which felt that plan participants would need information
concerning the issuer for whom they worked as much as members of thie
investing public need information about other issuers. As a result of this
expression of Congressional intent, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) had "no alternative but to interpret the [Securities]
Act as applying to employees' pension plans which involve a 'sale.' "13
Therefore, as early as 1934, Congress and the SEC had accepted the
premise that an interest in a pension fund is a security. However, the
mere existence of a security, absent a sale, does not invoke the protec-
tions and requirements of the securities laws. 14 The SEC accepted the
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331-8348 (1976).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1976).
11. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
12. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 895-96 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings].
13. Id. at 896.
14. The 1933 Act requires registration only if there is a concomitant offer to sell or
offer to buy. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976). The antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, id. § 77q,
is implemented only in the event of an "offer or sale" of a security. The antifraud
provision of the 1934 Act, id. § 78j(b), requires that there be a "purchase or sale" before it
is activated.
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view prevailing at that time that a pension was a gratuity 5 if employees
did not directly contribute money to the fund. If the pension was a gift
from the employer to the employee, there was no disposition for value
and, therefore, no sale under the Act.
16
This position of the Commission was made public in an opinion letter
from the Assistant General Counsel of the SEC, which stated unequivo-
cally that an interest in an employee pension fund is considered an
"investment contract," a term synonymous with "security." The letter
went on to say, however, that the SEC required registration only when
there was the presence of both a security and a sale. The Assistant
General Counsel indicated that there was no sale for purposes of regis-
tration in the case of a noncontributory plan or a compulsory plan. 17 The
absence of a sale was based on alternate theories. If the plan was
noncontributory, there was no disposition for value, an express require-
ment under the Act. On the other hand, if the plan was compulsory, no
voluntary investment decision was made by the employee. 8
15. PENSION PLANNING, supra note 7, at 14.
16. "'rhe term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
17. Id. § 77b(1). [1975] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.53. This letter was an
echo of Commissioner Purcell's testimony before Congress: "Any plan under which
employees are given the opportunity to place part of their earnings in a fund which is to be
invested for their benefit and returned to them at a later date involves the offering of an
'investment contract.' " 1941 Hearings, supra note 12, at 907, 908. Commissioner Purcell
went on to explain the similarities between pension plans and investment companies
offering securities to the general public. See generally, Jaretzki, The In vestment Company
Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941).
18. This second theory is not expressed in the securities laws. Congress did not amend
the definition of "sale" to include an element of volition. The sudden need for this novel,
but allegedly essential, ingredient of a sale may. have had its beginnings in economic
necessity. Many corporations hard hit by the Depression were attempting to reorganize,
merge, somehow stay afloat on a very turbulent economic sea, when suddenly federal
regulation came bursting over an already cloudy horizon. Perhaps the government had no
desire to unnecessarily burden these battered corporations with the additional expenses of
registration. Whatever the precise cause, the SEC did create a remedy to exempt mergers
and similar corporate actions from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. This
corporate lifesaver-the "no sale" theory as it was called-made ,its public debut in 1935
as a note to Rule 5 of 1933 Act Registration Form E-1. The theory's rationale was later
stated in the Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ., 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1943).
In consolidations and mergers the alteration of the stockholder's security occurs
not because he consents to an exchange, but because the corporation by au-
thorized corporate action converts his security from one form to another. ...
Even though the stockholder may participate in the vote which results in changing
his rights as a'stockholder his action in so doing is the action of a member of the
corporation exercising his franchise, rather than the action of a security holder
choosing to accept an offer of exchange made to him as an individual.
The court stated that it was in accord with the "no sale" theory expressed in the SEC
brief. 134 F.2d at 694. Then, in April 1947, the Commission rescinded Form E-1. Although
[Vol. 27:364
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It is important to note that this letter found no sale for purposes of
registration. The judiciary has long supported the view that a "sale" can
exist within the meaning of the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts, despite the fact that the same transaction is not a "sale"
for the purposes of registration. 19 Congress itself has cautioned that the
same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of
the securities laws, by prefacing the lists of general definitions in both
Acts with the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires."
20
In the same year that the opinion letter dealing with the pension
interests was published, Congressman Paddock proposed a bill, H.R.
5065, which would have removed pension plans qualifying under what is
now Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code from the definition of
"security." 21 The necessary implication arising from this bill is that if
Congress had never intended that pension plans come within the securi-
ties laws, there would have been no reason to propose a bill to expressly
exclude them. Further, assuming that pension plans had originally come
under the Securities Acts, Congress could have removed the protections
of those Acts by accepting Congressman Paddock's proposal.
The SEC opposed enactment of H.R. 5065. The Commission clearly
indicated its position that pensions are securities and that the antifraud
provisions are available to employees who have been denied their pen-
sions:
H.R. 5065 could not only exempt employees' plans generally
from the registration provision of the act, but it would also
deprive employees of the protection now afforded them by the
fraud provisions of the statute. Even if it be assumed that there
are situations in which the protection of employees does not
justify the expense of registration, it hardly follows that em-
ployees should be denied a right under the act to recover from
employers who have actually deceived them. Under the act no
securities at all, not even Government securities, are exempted
from the fraud provisions of section 17(a).
22
Upholding the position of the SEC, Congress defeated H.R. 5065.
no mention of this theory was made in the rescission, it still continued as a Commission
interpretation. Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation
Finance, SEC, before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in New York
City (Feb. 24, 1959).
19. SEC v. National Sec., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969); Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 14 REC. A. B. CITY N. Y. 162 (1959); REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FROM THE DISCLOSURE
STUDY ("The Wheat Report") 257-59 (1969).
20. SEC v. National Sec., 393 U.S. at 466.
21. 1941 Hearings, supra note 12, at 907, 919-20.
22. The Securities and Exchange Commission, Proposals for Amendments to the
19781 .367
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II. VALUE IS GIVEN FOR THE PENSION INTEREST
The 1940's were the source of two streams of development which
would have profound effects on the "pension no sale" theory which the
Commission thought it had established in bedrock. One development
was the phenomenal expansion of pension plans in America; 23 the other,
the judiciary's expansive interpretations of the terms "security" and
"sale."
The period from 1940 to 1945 saw a dramatic growth in private pension
plans, attributable to the establishment of the Social Security system,
pressure from organized labor, social pressure, tax inducements, and
wage stabilization. The War Labor Board introduced a program of wage
stabilization as a part of a general price control scheme. 24 Employers
could no longer compete for labor, which was scarce due to the war
effort, by offering higher salaries. Unable to bargain for increased
wages, union members challenged their leaders to justify unionism. In an
attempt to offset these pressures on labor leaders and management, the
War Labor Board permitted employers to create fringe benefit programs,
including old-age and disability pensions. 25 In the competition to recruit
new employees and to retain existing employees despite outside offers of
alternate employment, the qualified retirement plan became an important
component of the total compensatory package offered by employers and
accepted by employees.
26
Viewed against this background, pension plans can no longer be con-
sidered gifts from a beneficent employer. Sums paid and payable into the
pension fund have been earned by each employee. The pension benefits
are actually deferred compensation. Thus the term "noncontributory" is
a misnomer, since the sum due each employee is expressly related to and
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. at
15, 16 (Aug. 7, 1941).
Unfortunately this SEC position escaped the notice of all the parties involved in the
Daniel case, including the SEC. In addition, the definition of sale for purposes of § 17(a)
and, therefore, for Rule lOb-5, is not the same as for registration. Thus, even if the courts
were to reject the Daniel theory of disposition for value, the unlitigated issue of whether
there was a sale remains.
23. The number of active workers covered by private pension plans swelled by 6
million. Assets of these plans approached $12 billion by the end of the decade. In the same
year annual benefit payments totalled 961 million. PENSION FACTS, supra note 5, at 19, 21,
39.
24. D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 21-28 (1975); PENSION PLAN-
NING, supra note 7, at 10.
25. As an added incentive to the establishment of private pension plans, employer
contributions to plans meeting Internal Revenue Service requirements were made deduct-
ible, I.R.C. §§ 401-404.
26. See D. MCGILL, supra note 24, at 3-73 (1975).
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measured by the employee's work.27 Pensions have become a system of
forced saving and investing, under which the American working public,
convinced by employers and unions, foregoes present creature comforts
and pleasures in exchange for security in old age.
The judiciary acknowledged these realities in Inland Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 28 noting that employers were required to bargain on pensions
and that such plans were part of the entire wage structure. 29 In reaching
this decision, the court rejected the argument
that an employee is a stranger to a retirement and pension plan
during all the days of his employment and that it affects him in
no manner until he arrives at the retirement age. We think such
reasoning is without logic. Suppose that a person seeking em-
ployment was offered a job by each of two companies equal in
all respects except that one had a retirement and pension plan
and that the other did not. We think it reasonable to assume an
acceptance of the job with the company which had such plan.
Of course, that might be described merely as the inducement
which caused the job to be accepted, but on acceptance it would
become, so we think, one of the 'conditions of employment. 
30
The court thus recognized that a pension can have two characters, two
personalities, depending upon the point in time at which the pension is
viewed. First, as the court recognized, employee consideration of the
offered pension involves a separate and distinct decision to be made in
determining whether or not to accept employment.3" Once accepted, the
pension becomes a condition of employment that affects an employee's
decision to keep a position.
32
27. See Joint Indus. Board of Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 230, 231
(1968).
28. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
29. Id. at 253. See 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2552 n.147a (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
30. 170 F.2d at 253.
31. Id. This view by the judiciary has been accepted by the Congress, which acknowl-
edged the need to "give the employee-beneficiaries of these plans an accounting for the
money they spend and which is spent in their behalf for future security benefits and
permits them to appraise the merits of these plans, which in many cases are held out to
them as a competitive inducement of employment." S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1958), reprinted in [19581 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4137, 4155 (emphasis
added).
32. A pension program created by collective bargaining is not a gift which can be
eliminated unilaterally by the employer, but rather reflects the employees' willingness to
reduce demands in other economic areas. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, Lodge No. 1194 v. Garwood Indus., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ohio
1973), modified sub nom. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Lodge No. 1194 v. Sargent Indus., 522 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1975).
1978]
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The Inland Steel case thus furnished a basis for including noncon-
tributory and compulsory pension plans under the protection of the
seucrities laws, because it established that an employee gives value in
return for his interest in the pension plan, thereby meeting the Securities
Act definition of sale. This approach to the pension fund interest as
involving a sale of a security has emphasized the legislative history of the
securities laws and the judicial history of pensions. However, the issue
of whether an employee's interest in a pension fund involves a sale of a
security was not presented to a court until Daniel v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters in 1976. 33 The Daniel court inverted the
analysis. Instead of considering the legislative history of the securities
laws and the judicial history of pensions, the court stressed the judicial
history of the securities laws and the legislative history of pensions.
III. DANIEL IN THE TEAMSTERS' DEN
John Daniel had worked as a truck driver for twenty-two and one-half
years for employers who contributed to a pension fund jointly adminis-
tered by the employers and the Teamsters. 34 Daniel applied for, but was
denied, his pension by Local 705 because of his failure to satisfy the
plan's length of service requirement. He had been laid off involuntarily
for several months beginning in December 1960. This break in service
interrupted the twenty consecutive years of employment necessary to be
eligible for benefits under the pension plan. Daniel filed a class action in
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Local 705
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, charging that the pen-
sion denial violated the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the National Labor Relations Act, and common law princi-
ples of trust and fiduciary duties. He alleged that misleading statements
of material facts and material omissions concerning length and continuity
of service were violative of the federal securities laws. The Teamsters
moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the securities laws do
not apply to an employee's interest in a pension plan, since pension plans
are pervasively regulated under the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA). a5 The district court, in denying the motion to dismiss,
held that an interest in a pension fund fits within the definition of a
security; that the exchange of employee service for that interest in the
fund is a sale within the meaning of the securities laws; and that the
enactment of ERISA did not preempt the application of the antifraud
33. 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. III. 1976), aff'd, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978) (No. 77-753).
34. 561 F.2d at 1227.
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1368 (Supp. V 1975).
[Vol. 27:364
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provisions of the securities laws to interests in pension funds.36 When the
issue of whether the antifraud provisions of the securities laws apply to
pension interests was certified on interlocutory appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, that court affirmed the
district court's decision.
37
In reaching its decision the circuit court relied on SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.,38 in which the Supreme Court delineated the elements of an "in-
vestment contract" which would meet the statutory definition of a "se-
curity":
[Amn investment contract. . . means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enter-
prise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares
in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enter-
prise.
39
The Daniel court found that a pension plan contains the necessary
elements of an investment contract: (1) money is invested-in the plan by
the employee when his employer makes a contribution; (2) the pension
plan trustees are "third parties"' who manage the plan; and (3) profits, in
the form of retirement benefits, are expected from the successful man-
agement of the funds.4°
The Teamsters argued that no profit element, and therefore no "in-
vestment contract" existed. In support of their position, the Teamsters
relied heavily on United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,41 in which
the Supreme Court ruled that an interest in a cooperative housing devel-
opment, although represented by a "stock certificate," did not consti-
tute a security. The Forman Court noted that in light of the economic
realities of the situation, the intent of the purchaser was to acquire
housing, not to acquire a security. 42 In Forman, however, there was no
risk to the buyer's initial investment43 and the purchaser could not expect
a profit from his purchase in the normal investment sense. 44
36. 410 F. Supp. at 547-53.
37. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
38. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
39. Id. at 298-99.
40. 561 F.2d at 1231-35.
41. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
42. The Forman Court relied on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1%7), which
held that "in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." Id.
at 348.
43. See SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1943) (risk of loss of
initial value is an essential attribute of a security).
44. The Teamsters argued that in view of Forman, a successful analogy cannot be
1978]
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The Teamsters argued that a compulsory, noncontributory pension
plan does not meet the Forman economic reality test, because the
worker is merely making an employment decision, and not an investment
decision.4 5 Such an argument not only fails to comport with the analysis
of the court in Inland Steel,46 but also harkens back to the days when
pensions were considered gifts. The economic inducement of the pen-
sion alters the basic nature of the employment decision, and this altera-
tion is critical to any application of the Forman economic reality test to
an interest in a pension plan.4 7
In addition, the Howey Court had held that an interest in a citrus grove
development was an "investment contract" because that interest fell
within the language of section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 which
defines a "security" as any "investment contract." In so holding, the
Howey Court had rejected the argument that the existence of an invest-
ment contract is precluded "where the tangible interest which is sold has
intrinsic value independent of the success of the enterprise as a
whole."48 Just as the Supreme court recognized in Howey that there was
more than a purchase of citrus groves, the Daniel court found that the
employees were not just accepting jobs, but were investing their right to
present compensation in the hope of securing a deferred income from the
competent administration of the pension fund by independent third
parties.
The Teamsters argued that there was no expectation of profit by an
employee in a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan and that under
drawn between an interest in a pension and a security. The fallacy in this argument is
apparent when considered in light of the following statement of former Chairman of the
SEC, Manuel F. Cohen: "Interests in a private pension plan fall within the definition of a
security under the Securities Act of 1933, and most private pension plans would be subject
to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 but for a specific exemption
from that statute." Hearings on S.3598 before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1972). See generally,
Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and
Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 795 (1964). Since the SEC never
changed its position that interests in private pensions are securities, one is left to wonder
why it is necessary for the Teamsters to create an analogy.
45. See Brief for Appellant at 18-21, and Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae at 5-8, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
46. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). See text accom-
panying notes 28-30 supra.
47. The Forman Court recognized the need to consider the whole transaction: " 'Un-
disputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion that defendants were not,
as a practical matter, offering naked leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants
omitted the economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration well, it
would have been quite a different proposition.' " 421 U.S. at 853 n.18 (quoting SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943).
48. 328 U.S. at 298, 301.
[Vol. 27:364
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the Howey decision a security must involve an expectation of profit. 49
Since the benefit is defined,50 there is no profit. This argument is faulty
for several reasons. The term "profit" as used in the Howey formula
was a description of an investment yield. The Howey Court had express-
ly rejected the suggestion that there could be no security unless an
enterprise was speculative, i.e., the degree of risk was sufficiently high
so as to make the investment speculative. 5I However, the existence of a
security has been found when financial gain does not vary from year to
year, but the risk of loss varies with the promoter's management skills.
5 2
The distinction is precisely the same as that between a common stock
and a corporate bond. Typical debt securities carry an obligation to pay a
fixed return, yet no one denies that corporate bonds or debentures are
encompassed by the securities laws, even though they fail the Forman
test as construed by the Teamsters.
5 3
49. The need to find a "profit" element comes from the express language used in
Howey. However, the genesis of the Howey formula preceded the Howey decision. The
Howey Court admittedly was accepting "in other words" the language used in State v.
Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920), in which the state
supreme court held that an investment contract "came to mean a contract or scheme...
intended to secure income or profit." 328 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added). Considering the
deference the Howey Court gave to the meaning "crystallized by this prior [state] judicial
interpretation," id., there seems to be no valid reason to reject the language of the original
formula enunciated by the high court of Minnesota. Under this formula the final element
necessary to the existence of an investment contract is either income or profit. A defined
benefit is recognized as income and, therefore, satisfies the original investment contract
formula.
Congress, recognizing pensions as income, stated: "Regardless of the form they take,
the employers' share of the cost of these plans or the benefits the employers provide are a
form of compensation." S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1958), reprinted in
[1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4137, 4139.
50. Defined benefit plans provide a fixed benefit from the employer. The benefits are
established by a formula and contributions are based on actuarial calculations of the
amount necessary to fund those benefits. The contributions will vary according to fund
earnings and benefit payments. In contrast, under a defined contribution plan, the contri-
butions rather than the benefits are defined by a formula. The benefits payable at
retirement are based on the amount of money that has been set aside for each employee
during his working years and the earnings accrued as a result of the investment of that
money.
51. 328 U.S. at 301.
52. El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
900 (1974). Consequently, the profit element can be satisfied by a regular fixed return on
an investment, as in a defined benefit plan. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of
America, 359 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1959) (the term "security" is broad enough to include any
annuity contract, not just variable annuities). Cf. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55
Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (the objective of the corporate securities
act was to afford those who risked their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their
objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one
form or another).
53. Like an interest in a pension fund, debt securities carry no voting rights. They are
1978]
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Nevertheless, subsequent to the district court decision in Daniel, but
prior to the affirmance by the circuit court, the Teamsters successfully
argued that a participant in a defined benefit plan cannot have an expec-
tation of a profit. In Wiens v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters ,
4
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
held that an employee's interest in a noncontributory pension is not a
security, and that even if it were a security, there is no sale of that
security. 5 The court also failed completely to recognize the risk of the
initial investment.56 Since the employee under a defined benefit plan
receives his pension according to an established schedule, whether or not
the enterprise has suffered losses, 57 the court found that the employee
does not agree to bear the losses of the enterprise. Nonetheless there is a
risk. A defined benefit plan must be actuarially sound so that the monies
to pay the defined benefits will be available when needed. As in many
investment situations, the pension participant lacks familiarity with and
control over the enterprise, and thus is in great need of the antifraud
protections offered by the securities laws.' 8 The employee, like the
Wiens court, may ignore the element of risk, only to discover its exist-
ence after investing years of labor.
The Teamsters' local not only recognized the existence of the employ-
ees' expectation of profits, but it also catered to that profit motive by
making the fund more appealing to both current and would-be partici-
pants.
issued with a stated maturity date, analogous to a pension plan's fixed retirement date.
They are typically redeemable at the option of the corporation, usually when the interest
rate on the bonds is found to be excessive in light of interest rates in the marketplace.
Similarly, pension plans may be terminated for a valid business reason. Debt securities,
like interests in a pension fund, are typically issued pursuant to an elaborate contract or
indenture between the corporation and a trustee for the benefit of the holders of the
securities.
54. [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 1977).
55. In an unpublished opinion, the court stated that an employee does not sell his labor
in order to purchase an interest in the pension plan. Id. at 91,519. The court ignored
arguments concerning the SEC position on the issue, noting erroneously that this "posi-
tion has suddenly shifted after a long period in the other direction." Id.
56. Contra, SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
57. But cf. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 436 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D.
II1. 1977) (the right to future payments has no present value except in terms of the future
success of the enterprise).
58. The theory that there is no risk in a defined benefit plan stems from the fact that the
benefit is both ascertainable under the terms of the plan and guaranteed by a federal
agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1381
(Supp. V 1975). The PBGC, however, offers only a limited guarantee of vested benefits.
Therefore, if an employer becomes insolvent and terminates his pension plan, the employ-
ee stands to lose any part of the defined benefit not insured by the PBGC, even though the
employee has already given full value in the form of services rendered. However, the
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Although there are many factors which go into the actuarial
calculation, one of the most important is the investment per-
formance of the fund . . . .As Local 705 explained to its
members in 1969 in one of its information booklets: 'Another
advantage [of the Local 705 plan] is.that the contributions earn
income by being invested. Consequently, the money originally
contributed grows. Without this income growth, the fund could
not accumulate enough money to pay the $250.00 monthly pen-
sions provided by the Plan.'
59
IV. THE "PENSION No SALE" THEORY
The original objection to applying the securities laws to compulsory,
noncontributory plans stemmed from the SEC's belief that the employee
neither gave value' nor made an investment decision in such plans.
61
The district court in Daniel, however, held that there is a sale, because
"economically there is no distinction between the facts here [i.e.,
compulsory employer contributions] and the situation whereby the em-
ployee first receives as part of his wages the employer contribution in
better the investment experience of the pension fund, the greater a likelihood that an
employee will receive the entire expected return on his investment, if he has also main-
tained his status as an eligible plan participant. This investment risk consists of several
factors: whether the fund's investment experience meets its projected rate of return;
whether the employee achieves and maintains his eligibility; whether the money in the
fund is properly managed; and whether the plan will last long enough for the employee to
become vested. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967). In United
Benefit, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding that the guarantee of a fixed
payment annuity of a substantial amount gave the entire contract the character of insur-
ance. The Court accepted the SEC argument that the contract should be fragmented, since
two entirely distinct promises were included in the contract, and their operation was
separated at a fixed point in time. In the pension situation, the PBGC guarantee of a
portion of a defined benefit, while reducing substantially the investment risk, does not
make the risk disappear. The risk of insufficiency of the pension fund to pay the defined
benefit was believed to be shared by the employer and the employee. However, if recent
court decisions indicate any judicial trend, it is toward a very limited definition of
employer liability. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 436 F. Supp. 1334
(N.D. Ill. 1977); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Tenn-Ero Corp. and Avon Sole Co.,
Bankruptcy Nos. 75-1520-HL & 75-1521-HL (D. Mass. May 13, 1977), 13 C.B.C. 187;
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., Civ. No. 76-1314-T (D. Mass. May 13,
1977).
59. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 1I, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
60. "The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a
security or interest in a security for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
61. It is clear that § 2(3) of the 1933 Act does not purport to set forth an all inclusive
expression of the meaning of "sale". That section is couched in terms of "shall include,"
as contrasted with the use of the word "means" in 12 of the remaining 13 terms referred to
in § 2. The word "means" may encompass the universal meaning of a word, but "in-
cludes" clearly indicates that there are other meanings. Indeed, the introductory words of
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cash and then pays such cash over to the pension fund. ", 62 Although the
Teamsters challenged this position on appeal, their objection was formal-
istic at best, since they had admitted in their brief that "non-contributory
pension plans . . . constitute a form of compensation for an employee's
labor." '63 Moreover, the money that the employer contributes to the
pension program is "limited to money that he might otherwise spend for
wages or other employee benefits. "64 Thus the employee exchanges his
labor for the interest in the pension plan. The giving of labor in exchange
for a security has been held to constitute disposition for value.
65
In Daniel, the appellate court found that the employees made an
investment decision when they voted on the union-negotiated package,
which set out the division of income between salary and pension bene-
fits.66 The "pension no sale" theory assumes that the exchange of
services for an interest in the pension fund occurs not because the
participant consents to it, but because through authorized collective
bargaining the union and employer create the employee's interest. The
court recognized that at best this is correct only in a technical sense since
it overlooks the substance of the transaction. Even though a ratification
vote is not required by law, 67 the constitution of the International-
Brotherhood of Teamsters requires ratification of all collectively bar-
gained decisions. In voting, each member is expressing his voluntary and
individual acceptance of the interest in the pension fund. The union
acceptance is, therefore, the aggregate effect of the will of each partici-
pant to accept or reject the terms of the exchange. Only the participant
§ 2 state that the meanings expressed for the statutory terms are set forth "unless the
context otherwise requires," indicating that someone must interpret these words further
in appropriate instances. Since the SEC was set up to administer the Act, it would appear
that the Commission is the entity to perform this function. Certainly it is the best
qualified. On this basis, the Commission has the power to adopt a rule interpreting the
term "sale".
62. 410 F. Supp. at 553.
63. Brief for Appellant at 1I, 12, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
64. [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4137, 4144.
65. See Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972), in which the court agreed
with this line of reasoning.
66. 561 F.2d at 1243-44. The Department of Labor, inter alios, has challenged this
decision as a denial of the exclusive representation principle so fundamental to labor law
and policy. Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 5-14, Daniel v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977). The union's exclusive right to speak for
represented employees has received judicial sanction as a first principle in labor relations.
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); NLRB v. National Motor
Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1939). In spite of this exclusive right, members' views
are often registered prior to negotiations through information meetings and polls.
67. Cleveland Orchestra Comm. v. Cleveland Fed. of Musicians, Local No. 4, 303
F.2d 229, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 27:364
Pensions
who voluntarily accepts the exchange remains bound thereby, since each
employee makes a decision to continue working under the new contract.
It seems anomalous to compress the entire decision-making process and
give recognition to only a portion of what transpires, while ignoring the
ratification process necessary under the union constitution.
Finally, if the Daniel case had involved a voluntary, contributory plan,
there would have been nothing novel in a finding by the court that an
employee's interest in such a plan involved a sale of a security. The SEC
has long maintained that very position without challenge.' Although the
issue was not raised before the court, the pension in Daniel can be
considered voluntary and contributory, because it changes its fundamen-
tal nature depending on the employment status of the worker/participant.
The plan provides that whenever the employer is not obligated to make
contributions (e.g., if the employee is laid off), the employee may elect
to make such contributions and thereby remain a participant in the
plan. 69 Thus, during his involuntary break in service, Daniel could have
elected to be a voluntary, contributing member to the plan which at that
point was no longer compulsory and noncontributory. Under such cir-
cumstances his participation would have unquestionably involved dis-
position for value. Consequently, by its own terms, the double aspect of
the plan placed it within the reach of the securities laws.
70
V. APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES
LAWS TO PENSIONS: CONGRESSIONAL INTENTION
OR ADMINISTRATIVE INTRUSION?
The Daniel court held that public policy dictated the application of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws to provide protection not
68. [1977] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.50. In addition, since the major justifica-
tion of the "no sale" rule rests on the premise that the participant is not exercising any
individual choice, proof that a v'olitional element exists should negate the rule. Conse-
quently, situations in which possible elements of individual choice arise deserve careful
scrutiny.
69. Such contributions by the employee may be made for up to three months, after
which the employee must petition for an extension if necessary. See Brief for the SEC as
Amicus Curiae at 12, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.
1977).
70. To the extent that John Daniel was not affirmatively made aware of his right to
maintain his eligibility in the plan and was not informed that the failure to exercise that
right might involve a loss (as it did), there existed a material omission by the adminis-
trators of the plan. Such an omission is in violation of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws, which have always been held to apply to voluntary and contributory
pension plans. [1977] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.50. Therefore, the break in
service, which the defendants argue should deny the plaintiff his right to a pension, in
reality reinforces the right to apply the securities laws and their protections to this pension
plan.
1978]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 27:364
available either through qualification under the Internal Revenue Code 7'
or through existing pension legislation.7 2 This finding that a nexus exists
between securities and pensions sufficient to warrant the application of
the securities laws has aroused a storm of objections.
When Congress enacted ERISA, an intricate administrative system
73
was established to implement the new pension policy. Since this legisla-
tive plan is so detailed and extensive, the defendants argued that any
judicial imposition of additional duties would conflict with Congressional
intent.74 However, ERISA itself provides that: "[n]othing in this [title]
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or super-
sede any law of the United States . . . or any rule or regulation issued
under such law." 75 Significantly, although ERISA generally exempts
pension plans from state pension laws, 76 the Act specifically states that it
is not to be construed to exempt pension plans from state laws regulating
securities. 77 It would seem farfetched to claim that although no federal
laws have been preempted by ERISA 78 and no state laws dealing with
securities have been superseded by ERISA, Congress, nonetheless, im-
plied a suspension of the federal securities laws. Such an argument not
71. I.R.C. § 401.
72. See 29 U.S.C. 99 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975).
73. Id. §§ 1301-81.
74. Subsequent to Daniel, the Teamsters successfully argued this point in Hurn v.
Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus., 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). In addition to holding that a participant's interest in an employee pension plan
is not a security and that the acquisition of that interest does not involve a sale, the court
held that ERISA "provides the exclusive remedy for disputes over benefits between
'participants' . . . and 'employee pension benefit plans.' " Id. at 82. Cf. El Khadem v.
Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974). Appellants in El Khadem had argued
that the elements which the court relied upon to find the existence of a security are present
in a wide variety of financial transactions. However, the court noted that these transac-
tions are explicitly exempted from registration under 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976). The exemp-
tion was "not because investors do not need protection, but because other agencies
regulate the institutions involved." 494 F.2d at 1230 n. 14. The very same arguments may
be raised regarding the 1970 amendments to the securities laws and pension fund interests.
ERISA provides a certain protection, analogous to the registration requirements of the
Securities Act. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (Supp. V 1975) with 15 U.S.C. § 77g
(1976). However, nowhere in ERISA is there the broad protection offered by the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. ERISA provides no relief for fraud perpetrated outside
of those limited written materials required under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 1975).
Multiple risks to employee pension interests are like the heads of the Hydra of Greek
mythology. Eliminating one head may look quite impressive, but it does not kill the
monster.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (Supp. V 1975).
76. d. §§ 1003(a), 1144(b)(2)(A).
77. Also left untouched are state laws dealing with banking and insurance. Id.
§ I I44(b)(2)(A).
78. But see 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (Supp. V 1975) (repealing the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act, Pub. L. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958)).
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only inverts a fortiori logic, but it also ignores the rules of statutory
construction .79
In enacting ERISA, Congress sought to protect employees and their
dependents when pension funds terminate without sufficient assets to
satisfy the benefit expectations of its participants. ERISA is an attempt
to minimize losses to beneficiaries by reducing the probability of self-
dealing on the part of fund trustees, bad investments by fund adminis-
trators, and inadequate funding. This legislation deals with the ongoing
administration of pension funds, not the decision to participate in the
pension plan. ERISA was created to protect an employee's interest in his
pension plan, 80 rather than to prevent fraud in the acquisition of that
interest. This intent is clear from the timing of ERISA disclosures to plan
participants, since disclosures are only required after an employee has
entered the plan.
8 1
In contrast, under the securities laws disclosure must be made at the
time of the offer 2 to provide the investor with an opportunity to make an
informed decision. A similar disclosure would give the potential plan
participant the opportunity to make an informed decision whether to
accept or reject an interest in the pension fund. 83 If employees are made
aware of the risks that exist in their pension plans, they can more
realistically consider the problems of providing for themselves and their
families after retirement. For example, a plan may be terminated with
impunity for a valid business purpose.81 In such a situation an employee
79. 1-A A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.06 (4th ed. 1972).
'The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of the
statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings, as the
wider popular instead of the more narrow technical one; but the words should be
taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the other, as will best manifest the
legislative intent.' In the present case we do nothing to the words of the Act; we
merely accept them.
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 355 (quoting United States v. Hartwell, 73
U.S. (6 Wall) 385, 396 (1867)). The Daniel court has pursued a similar course. Quite
recently the Supreme Court stressed that in interpreting the federal securities laws, "the
starting point in every case . . . is the language [of the statute] itself." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
80. 120 CONG. REC. 4277-78 (1974). "It is a modest bill. It does not purport to solve
every problem." Id. at 4278 (remarks of Rep. Perkins).
81. The plan administrator is afforded three months in which to inform the participant
concerning the interest for which the participant gives value every day that he works. 29
U.S.C. § 1024(b) (Supp. V 1975).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(10), 77g, 77j (1976).
83. ERISA permits an employer to limit pension plan participation to employees aged
twenty-five or older. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (Supp. V 1975). Thus, if an employee goes to work
at age eighteen, his employer can legally wait seven years and three months before
revealing to him the terms of the plan.
84. Even within the first year, if terminated for a valid business reason, a plan does not
retroactively lose its qualified status. See Kane Chevrolet Co. v. C.I.R., 32 T.C. 596
(1959); I.R.C. § 401a.
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who is not vested will receive no pension for the labor he has already
performed. Under ERISA the employee would be ignorant of the risk.
However, if the participant's position as an investor is recognized, then
he is entitled at the time of his investment decision to all the protections
of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
85
Even though the employer's preference as to setting up a plan may be
at odds with the full disclosure to the employee of the risks involved in
participating in the plan, the rule of caveat emptor should not reward
fraud and deception. Congress has repeatedly recognized the importance
of disclosure. 86 Moreover, the employer's disclosure must be in such
form as to make its significance apparent. 87 Rather than controverting
Congressional intent, application of the securities laws to pensions tends
to make that intent a reality.8
VI. CONCLUSION
Pension funds have become an investment vehicle for millions of
Americans. Although pensions are in some ways dissimilar to stocks and
bonds, the most easily recognized forms of securities, the Supreme
Court has traditionally considered a host of factors in determining
whether an investment is a security, not the least of which is the econom-
ic reality underlying the transaction. In reliance on an expected pension
benefit, an employee may put aside nothing additional for the future.
This "work now, earn later" plan is an investment, involving risks
considerably greater than the participant can know, absent the assistance
of the federal securities laws. Viable remedial legislation must be capable
of wider application than simply to the evil which inspired its enactment.
The protections Congress sought for pension plan participants can only
be reached through the interaction of the federal securities laws with
ERISA.
David R. Levin
85. "Too many people pay money into private pension plans year after year expecting
eventually to receive retirement income, and they end up getting nothing." 120 CONG.
REC. 4277 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Perkins).
86. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a), 552a(b), 556 (1976);
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1976).
87. See In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648 (1945); FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
88. The securities laws do not enable the SEC to protect investors by forbidding the
sale of "bad" securities. Rather, they require disclosure to the investor of the facts he
needs to make an informed judgment concerning the nature and quality of the interest
being offered. "[Olnce full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of
the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the [securities] statute." Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977). In contrast, ERISA has been an attempt to create
a means for determining the fairness and reliability of pensions. Only "good" pensions
can supposedly qualify for preferential tax treatment under the law.
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